Masaki Aoyagi

 

Publications

[1]  gThe Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public and Private,h (with V. Bhaskar and Guillaume Frechette), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11(1), 1-43, 2019. Preprint version

[2] gBertrand Competition under Network Externalities (open access),h Journal of Economic Theory, 178, 517-550, 2018.

[3]  gSocial Learning and Delay in a Dynamic Model of Price Competition,h (with Hikmet Gunay and Manaswini Bhalla), Journal of Economic Theory, 165, 565-600, 2016. Preprint version

[4] gStrategic Obscurity in the Forecasting of Disasters,h Games and Economic Behavior, 87, 485–496, 2014. Preprint version

(Old version under the same title: 08/24/2013)

[5]  gCoordinating Adoption Decisions under Externalities and Incomplete Information,h Games and Economic Behavior, 77, 77-89, 2013.   Preprint version

 (Old version under the title gOptimal Coordination and Pricing of a Network under Incomplete Information,h 09/12/2011)

[6] gInformation Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament,h Games and Economic Behavior, 70, 242-260, 2010.   Preprint version

(Old version under the same title: 04/05/2007)

[7] gOptimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers,h American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(1), 150-182, 2010.   Preprint version   Supplements

[8] gCollusion as Public Monitoring Becomes Noisy: Experimental Evidence,h (with Guillaume Fréchette), Journal of Economic Theory, 144(3), 1135-65, 2009.   Preprint version

[9] gEfficient Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Communication,h Journal of Economic Theory, 134, 61-92, 2007.   Preprint version

[10] gCollusion through Mediated Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring,h Economic Theory, 25, 455-475, 2005.   Preprint version

[11] gBid Rotation and Collusion in Repeated Auctions,h Journal of Economic Theory, 112, 79-105, 2003.   Preprint version

[12] gCollusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals,h Journal of Economic Theory, 102, 229-248, 2002.   Preprint version

[13] gMutual Observability and the Convergence of Actions in a Multi-Person Two-Armed Bandit Model,h Journal of Economic Theory, 82, 405-424, 1998. Corrigendum (09/13/05)

[14] gCorrelated Types and Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Budget Balance, h Journal of Economic Theory, 79, 142-151, 1998.

[15] gEquilibrium Delay in a Simple Dynamic Model of Investment,h Economic Theory, 12, 123-146, 1998.

[16] gReputation and Dynamic Stackelberg Leadership in Infinitely Repeated Games,h Journal of Economic Theory, 71, 378-393, 1996.

[17] gEvolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of Normal Form Games,h Journal of Economic Theory, 70, 444-469, 1996.

[18] gReputation and Entry Deterrence under Short-run Ownership of a Firm,h Journal of Economic Theory, 69, 411-430, 1996.

[19] gSpatial Competition of Firms in a Two-dimensional Bounded Market,h (with Atsuyuki Okabe) Regional Science and Urban Economics, 23, 259-289, 1993

[20] gExistence of Equilibrium Configurations of Competitive Firms on an Infinite Two Dimensional Space,h (with Atsuyuki Okabe) Journal of Urban Economics, 29, 349-370, 1991

[21] gAn Introductory Note on the Locational Competition of Firms in a Bounded Two Dimensional Market - The Possibilities of Equilibrium under Uniform Pricing -,h Studies in Regional Science, 19, 1-18, 1989 (in Japanese).

[22] gEquilibrium of Spatial Competition in an Infinite Two-Dimensional Market,h Studies in Regional Science, 18, 57-74, 1988 (in Japanese).

 

Working Papers

[1]    gVoluntary Redistribution Mechanism in Asymmetric Coordination Games,h (with Naoko Nishimura and Yoshitaka Okano, Experimental instructions, Last Update: 02/25/2019)

[2]    gBertrand Competition under Network Externalities,h (Old version: 02/15/2016).

[3]     gOptimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers,h (Last update: 07/12/2008) Matlab programs: 1 and 2

[4]     gMerging of Actions in a Two-Person Two-Armed Bandit with Asymmetric Information,h 1998.

[5]    gEfficiency of Evolutionary Stability in Games of Common Interest with Pre-play Communication,h 1997.

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Last modified: October 17, 2018